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Abstract
In this programmatic paper, we articulate a minimalist conception of linguistic composition, syntactic
and semantic, with the aim of identifying fundamental operations invoked by the human faculty of
language (HFL). On this view, all complex expressions are formed via the operation COMBINE(A, B).
But this operation is not primitive: COMBINE(A, B) = LABEL[CONCATENATE(A, B)]. We take
labeling to be a computationally simple but perhaps distinctively human operation that converts a mere
concatenation of expressions, like A^B, into a more complex unit like [A A^B], with the subscript
indicating a copy of the dominant constituent. We discuss several virtues of this spare conception of
syntax. With regard to semantics, we take instances of COMBINE(A, B) to be instructions to build
concepts. More specifically, we claim that concatenation is an instruction to conjoin monadic con-
cepts, while labeling provides a vehicle for invoking thematic concepts, as indicated by the rele-
vant labels.
Key words: basic operations, concatenate, label, copy, conjoin, close.
1. Introduction
We take it as given that humans have a faculty of language, stable states of which
can be described as I-languages in Chomsky’s (1986) sense. Idealizing, one can
describe HFL as a biologically implemented capacity to acquire and use (in nor-
mal conditions of experience) one or more recursive procedures that associate
phonological instructions to articulatory/perceptual systems with semantic instruc-
tions to conceptual/intentional systems, by means of a constrained syntax; cp.
Chomsky (1995). 
Abstracting from phonology, we assume that expressions of an I-language are
semantic instructions whose structural properties are determined by (i) principles
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governing the combination of I-language elements, and (ii) constraints on how
HFL can naturally “interface with” other aspects of cognition. From this perspec-
tive, one joint task for syntacticians and semanticists is to specify the relevant ele-
ments and structural properties, along with a biologically implementable algorithm
for generating complex expressions, which can be treated as instructions to con-
struct mental representations of some kind from language-independent cognitive
resources.
In developing a specific proposal, we also want to stress two dovetailing points.
First, while “poverty of stimulus” arguments reveal the inadequacy of empiricist
accounts of language acquisition, appealing to innate principles is only a first step
towards explaining how and why children acquire the languages they do. Second,
morals from the study of vision remain relevant for the study of language; see
Poeppel and Embick (2005), discussed below.
Regarding the first point, we take it as given that HFL respects logically con-
tingent language-specific constraints, which can be described as an innate Universal
Grammar (UG) that all children use in acquiring their sundry I-languages. This
raises familiar questions about language variation. But even if nativists can account
for such variation, say in terms of lexical and parametric differences, getting beyond
a mere description of the child’s innate endowment requires some account of how
constraints of UG are enforced by HFL and why those constraints are the ones
enforced. Could a different faculty—one that imposed alternative constraints on
acquirable languages—have emerged from the available biological building blocks.
Or is HFL the only linguistic system that creatures like us could have had? Or was
there a small range of possibilities, with a combination of selective pressure and
contingency leading to the actual result? 
Theorists should address such questions, in accounts of why language acquisition
is constrained in the ways it is, and providing answers requires thought about how
constraints of UG might be implemented. The space of “possible language facul-
ties” depends on which operations can be carried out by a biology like ours, and
how these operations can be recruited to recursively combine lexical correlates of
concepts. Moreover, the natural history that led to HFL was presumably one in
which some new but modest capacity was added to a primate mind. In which case,
if one wants to explain how a certain line of primates acquired a capacity to acquire
human languages, one needs an account of how this talent could have been unleashed
by a small biological change. 
This brings us to the second point above. We view the task of getting beyond
mere description of innate linguistic constraints, and moving towards an explana-
tion of how and why HFL has just these constraints, as akin to the task described
by Marr (1982) in the context of studying vision. Given a description of the input-
output profile for some posited cognitive system, one can and should ask how that
system computes the relevant function, bearing in mind that nature has somehow
realized the actual algorithm. And at least initially, it can be useful to abstract from
various details of the input-output profile, in order to identify some fundamental
operations—perhaps corresponding to an important subsystem—that are especially
good candidates for realization. The study of how animals represent distal geom-
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etry was advanced by focusing on how a computational system might detect edges,
given certain information, and then asking how the relevant computations might
be implemented by available wetware. In linguistics, syntacticians and semanti-
cists share the question of how humans associate strings of words with complex
meanings. We propose to address this question by investigating how a simple sys-
tem, equipped to perform just a few basic operations, might recursively combine lex-
ical correlates of concepts in a way that approximates what humans do in this
regard. Ideally, discrepancies between the simple model and observations will be
due to complicating interactions between the core system and other cognitive sys-
tems deployed in language use. 
This is not to deny or even ignore the salient differences between (the studies
of) language and vision. On the contrary, and in particular, we take it to be an
explanandum that I-languages are distinctly human procedures for generating
expressions. Other animals do not—and apparently cannot—associate the sounds
of English (or signs of ASL) with all and only the meanings that children can nat-
urally associate with these distinctively human signals. Yet the procedures that
children easily acquire are somehow implemented with biological circuitry that is
presumably not different in kind from that of our evolutionary cousins; cp. Poeppel
and Embick (2005). So our working hypothesis is that I-language composition
adds something to more ancient cognitive operations that are available to other ani-
mals. But other things equal, any posited “human twist” should be minimal—both
methodologically, and in terms of any novel circuitry required.1
Many theorists will not share our particular biolinguistic conception, adopted
here without argument, of the theoretical project that syntacticians and semanti-
cists share. But however one thinks about the target of inquiry in this domain, it is
all too easy to simplify an extant theory of syntax by positing a sophisticated (and
perhaps unimplementable) mapping from the allegedly simple grammatical forms
to the corresponding mental representations. Likewise, one might purchase sim-
plicity in semantics at the cost of grammatical forms that are not generable by a
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1. Contrary to what some critics of minimalism have suggested, one can pursue this program while
assuming, as we do, that Government and Binding proposals are roughly correct. We view
Minimalism as an attempt to simplify GB proposals, abstracting away from certain details con-
cerning the best descriptions of particular languages, with the aim of connecting the theoretical
core of such proposals with the broader and ultimately biological questions gestured at above.
Explaining how humans (came to have a capacity to) acquire languages, and why these languages
are governed by the principles that linguists discover, requires theoretical work of a sort familiar in
other sciences. In addition to seeking more refined principles, which permit better and more detailed
descriptions of particular languages, one must also look for underlying elementary principles that
may be far removed from the observations and generalizations that initiated the inquiry. Because
the GB program was so successful, in providing a sketch of what the human faculty of language must
be like, one can and should ask which basic operations this faculty employs. Mature language
users presumably supplement these operations with many cognitive and communicative strategies
that have been learned or otherwise acquired. But even if full linguistic competence requires more
than mere facility with the basic operations employed by the language faculty, narrowly described,
identifying these operations remains a central theoretical task in linguistics; see Hauser, Chomsky,
and Fitch (2002).
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procedure that children can naturally come to implement. But this merely shifts
explanatory burdens in unhelpful way. There are various ways to do better. And
our aim here is not to argue against any. Instead, we want to illustrate the poten-
tial virtues of adopting a particular minimalist strategy: offer very spare concep-
tions of syntax and semantics, both of which might initially seem to be descrip-
tively inadequate; then show how the conceptions dovetail in ways that make the
theoretically attractive package empirically plausible.
To advertise, we think that combining expressions in an I-language is a uni-
form operation—COMBINE(A, B)—applicable to diverse pairs of expressions
that include lexical atoms, functional items, and endlessly many phrases. This oper-
ation is somehow asymmetric, since at least many complex operations are “head-
ed,” as opposed to being mere concatenations of constituents. But in our view,
COMBINE is not a primitive operation. It is rather the composition of two opera-
tions, CONCATENATE and LABEL;
COMBINE(A, B) = LABEL[CONCATENATE(A, B)]
where CONCATENATE(A, B) just is the concatenation of A with B, either or both
of which may already be labeled.2 The idea is that LABEL is a computationally
simple but perhaps distinctively human operation that converts a mere concatena-
tion like A^B into something more, like [A A^B], with the subscripted copy of A
indicating that this concatenate (as opposed to B) is the label/head of the new
expression; see Hornstein (2009). Concatenating the labeled expression with a third
expression C would thus yield [A A^B]^C, which might in turn be labeled with A
or C, as opposed to the mere concatenation A^B^C. In section two, we discuss
several virtues of this spare conception of I-language syntax.
Abstracting from phonology, we take each instance of COMBINE(A, B) to be
a semantic instruction. So let’s say that SEM{COMBINE(A, B)} is the semantic
instruction created by combining the simple expressions A and B. On our view,
then, the meaning of any complex expression is the meaning of a labeled concate-
nation.
SEM{COMBINE(A, B)} = SEM{LABEL[CONCATENATE(A, B)]}
Concatenation is presumably an ancient operation, widely available in animal
cognition.3 One might well expect its semantic correlate to be equally basic and
not specifically linguistic. In any case, we suggest that concatenation is an instruc-
tion to conjoin monadic concepts, and that labeling provides a vehicle for invok-
ing thematic relations when (and only when) the labels of concatenates conflict;
see Pietroski (2005, 2006). 
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2. By contrast, one might follow Chomsky (1995, 2000) in positing an asymmetric operation—
MERGE(A, B)—that is not decomposed into suboperations.
3. See, e.g., Gallistel (1993).
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The idea is that while SEM{[A A^B]} is always an instruction to invoke a con-
cept via A and conjoin it with another, there are two possibilities for how the sec-
ond concept is related to B. In expressions where the label of B is compatible with
A, the second concept is invoked directly via B itself. (Think of adjuncts, as in
‘blue armadillos’, corresponding to a concept of things that are both armadillos
and blue.) But in cases where the label of B conflicts with A—think of arguments,
as in ‘eat beets’—the second monadic concept is complex and partly thematic, like
EAT(E) & ∃X[PATIENT(E, X) & BEETS(X)], which has a thematic constituent that
includes a concept invoked via B.
2. Concatenate, Copy, and Label
As biologically instantiated cognitive systems, natural language grammars (NLGs)
seem special in several ways. Perhaps most distinctively, they generate an unbound-
ed number of objects with unique hierarchical properties (e.g. endocentric X’ struc-
tures). In addition, they exploit relations like c-command, and obey locality con-
ditions like Minimality, in generating expressions that respect generalizations like
Structure Preservation (among others). These features of NLGs have no obvious
analogues in animal minds/brains. One important minimalist question asks to what
degree this apparent distinctness is real, and how the genuinely distinctive aspects
of NLGs interrelate with other cognitive operations to yield grammatical struc-
tures. Recall that the more exceptional grammatical operations are, the harder it is
to explain their emergence and their physical embodiment. This suggests that the
apparent distinctness is largely superficial. One way to vindicate this thought is to
decompose operations like Merge and Move into simpler more generic basic com-
ponents and to derive the attested grammatical properties from their interactions. As
such, we take Move and Merge to be complex operations: Move is the combina-
tion of Copy and Merge, while Merge is the combination of Concatenate and Label.
Neither of these assumptions is especially novel. But in our view, some important
consequences of this decomposition have not yet been adequately explored or
appreciated.4
2.1. Is C-Command Primitive?
As an illustration, consider the following question: why are chains subject to c-
command? Why does the head of a chain c-command its foot? The GB answer is
that chains are grammatical objects defined in terms of c-command. This effec-
tively builds the c-command condition into UG, thereby making the c-command
requirement a primitive fact about NLGs. But one can answer the question differ-
ently, inviting a substantive and explanatory reduction of the fact (revealed by GB)
that chains are subject to c-command. Perhaps chains are constructed in a way that
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before; most prominently Chomsky’s myriad minimalist papers, Robert Berwick 1997 and Samuel
Epstein 1999. 
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requires the head to move to a position in which it c-commands the foot. This kind
of proposal can differ from the first, in interesting ways, depending on the details
of how chains are constructed. 
Here is one story. Chains are formed by Move, which is composed of simpler
operations, Copy and Merge (Chomsky 1995, Nunes 2004). Merge is subject to
the Extension Condition (EC), which only allows elements to be added to phrases
at the top. The operation in (3) meets this condition. The one in (4) does not. 
(3) A MERGE [C …C X B….] → [C A [C …C X B…]]
(4) A MERGE [C …C X B….] → [C …C A X B…]
If Move has Merge as a subpart, then Move is subject to EC. Consequently,
Move results in chains where each link c-commands its predecessors. Consider the
chain that results from moving X in (5).
(5) [B A [C …C X B…]] MOVE X → [B X [B A [C …C X B…]]] 
If moving X is matter of copying X and merging it (in an EC-obeying way)
with an expression of which X is a constituent, then the copy of X must merge at
the top. In which case, the head of the X-chain must c-command its foot. In this
way, we can explain/derive the fact that chains are subject to c-command.5
This approach immediately invites another question: why does Merge obey
EC? One possible answer is that Merge conforms to EC because EC is a “nice”
computational property. Perhaps it is somehow good for computational systems
like the language faculty to lose no information, in the sense that inputs of a Merge
operation are recoverable in the output. Note that in (3), each of the inputs—‘A’
and ‘[C …C X B…]]’ —is a constituent of the output expression, ‘[C A [C …C X
B…]]’. This is not the case in (4). Thus, EC enforces a monotonicity requirement
on structure-building operations: they can add but not substract information. (This
kind of requirement is characteristic of certain subprocesses in vision.) If it is good
to be able to recover a phrase’s parts—say, to compute some aspects of its phono-
logical or logical form—then EC would be a good property for structure building
operations like Merge to respect. So perhaps EC applies to structure building oper-
ations because the language faculty is well designed, and well designed systems
have “nice” computational properties like monotonicity. 
We prefer a less teleological account. But sketching our proposal requires
a brief detour. Consider again the fine structure of Merge. It does two separate
(though related) things. First, it is an operation that combines two elements
into a new object. Second, the object so formed can be subsequently combined
with other elements to form further new combinable objects. This invites an
analysis according to which Merge is a complex operation with two subparts:
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one that simply combines objects; and one that ensures that any output of this
first operation can be (an input to this operation, and thereby be) combined
with other objects. It is useful, developing this analysis, to contrast Merge with
Concatenate. 
Concatenation is, computationally, an elementary mode of combination.6 Like
any such operation, it is defined over a set of atoms. What one gets from concate-
nation depends on which atoms are being manipulated. Concatenating the letters t,
h, e, c, a, t can yield the complexes t^h^e^c^a^t or t^c^h^a^e^t, among many oth-
ers; while concatenating the words the, cat can yield (only) the^cat or cat^the.
These complexes are weakly similar—t^h^e^c^a^t and the^cat have the same ortho-
graphic string order—but strongly distinct; t^c^h^a^e^t is a possible output of con-
catenating letters but not words. Specifying the relevant atoms is thus crucial for
determining the complexes that can be formed by concatenation. Though correla-
tively, the operation Concatenate is not itself domain specific. Relevant atoms can
include phonemes, syllables, sentences, actions, plans, flowers, galaxies, electrons,
or whatever. The mental life of non-verbal beings surely involves concatenating
some elements (though not others) into larger sequential objects. So in this sense,
Concatenate is presumably not specific to the human language faculty, but instead
a much older operation to which something distinctively human could have been
added.
It is often assumed that Concatenate is not the operation that knits together the
lexical atoms of a sentence as concatenating words/morphemes would appear to
yield flat “beads on a string” expressions. Concatenating the, dog, barks can yield
the^dog^barks, but not [[the dog] barks]; where bracketing indicates genuine lin-
guistic composition. This can make it seem that phrases and sentences, which
exhibit hierarchical structure, cannot be concatenations of lexical atoms. But the
reasoning here relies on a premise that we reject—viz., that complexes like the^dog
are not atoms for concatenation, even though their lexical parts are. We agree that
phrases and sentences cannot be mere concatenations of lexical items: an addi-
tional operation O, which effectively marks the result of concatenating two items
as a third potential concatenate, is required. But if complexes built via Concatenate
can somehow be treated as atomic inputs to subsequent instances of this operation,
and so [[the dog] barks] is reducible to O(the^dog)^barks, then Concatenate does
suffice to yield hierarchy given the additional operation O. 
The idea, familiar in one sense, is that [[the dog] barks] differs from
the^dog^barks in the following respect: in the former but not the latter, barks was
concatenated with the^dog, which was (despite having parts) treated as an atom in
the sense of being available for concatenation. From this perspective, [[the dog]
barks] is hierarchical because one of its two concatenates was generated via the
operation Concatenate. This frames, without yet answering, the real question:
what operation ensures that a complex linguistic thing is a potential input to
Concatenate, given that (i) this domain-general operation can be applied to lan-
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guage only via some specification of relevant atoms, and (ii) this specification is
presumably given in terms of lexical elements? Or put another way, what makes
the^dog atomic in the relevant sense, despite its obvious complexity? Our pro-
posal is that Labels do the trick, and that this is one way in which adding a rela-
tively modest operation to a very simple system can have a dramatic effect. Let’s
see how.
2.2. Labels
Chomsky (1995) analyzes phrase building as consisting of two operations. The
first operation Merge, surveyed in (5), takes a pair of atoms and combines them.
If this aspect of Merge just is Concatenate, as we suggest, it is reflected with (6a).
The second operation is labeling. This operation “names” the resulting linguistic
object via one of the inputs as in (6b).
(6) a. Concatenate A,B → A^B
b. Label A^B → [A A^B]
The square brackets, with subscript ‘A’, should be read as saying that a certain
object (viz., the result of concatenating A with B) has label A. Note that while
Concatenate takes two inputs, each of which may be simple, the operation Label
takes an output of Concatenate and returns a similar complex object (with an addi-
tional copy of something). The latter operation, we suggest, makes complexes like
A^B into potential concatenates—i.e., things “visible” to Concatenate as atoms
that can be combined with others.7
This is, in some ways, a return to an old idea. In Chomsky (1955), labels on
phrase markers were understood to define the ‘is-a’ relation. For example, (7) iden-
tifies V^NP as a VP.
(7) a. VP → V NP
b. [VP V NP]
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7. Chomsky has recently discussed this recombinative power in terms of “Edge Features.” These
are features that primitive lexical atoms have and that combinations of lexical atoms have. The
proposal is that labeling is the operation whereby complexes inherit their edge features from
those of their sub-elements. What labeling does (e.g., turn a^b into [
a
a^b]) is allow the complex
to be treated as an atom as regards further combination. Note, without something like labeling
or edge features there is no well defined notion of the combination operation. What labeling
does is extend a more primitive operation of combination/merge/concatenate given a primitive
one; given edge features then hierarchy follows if complexes inherit these features from their
parts in some way. However, the Merge operation is only defined over a class of inputs with
some feature; be it an edge feature or a label. Absent this, there is no operation defined at all.
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Applied to (6b), the labeling says that A^B is (an) A. So understood, the formal
effect of labeling is to generate a closure of concatenation within the domain of
lexical atoms by mapping each concatenated complex to one of its atomic parts.8
On this view, the labeling in (6b) implies that A^B is as concatenable as A itself.
Any system that can generate A^B treats A as a concatenatable item; and given a
capacity to use A as a label, a simple system should treat A^B, so labeled, as equal-
ly concatenable. One could, of course, design a machine that detects and refuses
to concatenate any “type-A expressions that have parts.” But absent substantive
and encodable assumptions to the contrary, a naturally emerging system that can con-
catenate A with B should treat anything that counts as (an) A as a concatenatable
item. In which case, labeling A^B as (an) A would make A^B an atom for pur-
poses of subsequent concatenation. Thus, by simply adding the operation Label to
a system that allows atoms to concatenate, one can get a system that allows unbound-
ed structured hierarchies of the X’-variety.9
For labels to work their hierarchy-inducing magic, labels must be understood
in a bare phrase structure (BPS) manner. There are no bar levels on the label in
(6b): A^B is not labeled A’, or AP, but simply A. This is required for the derived
object to be further concatenable. For unlike A’ and AP, only A is a lexical primi-
tive, and only it can enter into concatenations. This comports with the BPS idea,
following Muysken (1982), that bar-levels are (at most) relational properties of a
phrase. There is no intrinsic syntactic difference between an A, A’ and AP. So if
Concatenate is blind to relational properties, then as far as this operation is con-
cerned, a labeled concatenate simply is an atom and so available for further con-
catenation. Put another way: if there is endocentric labeling, and labels are interpreted
as defining the “is a” relation in a BPS manner, and Concatenate only recognizes
the intrinsic features of items (not relational ones), then this simple operation can
yield nested structures.10
We were, recall, asking why Merge respects the Extension Condition (EC).
And we detoured, to motivate the following claim: given labels and the corre-
sponding derived labeled “atoms,” Merge can be identified with Concatenate. For
if Merge is indeed a species of concatenation, and labeling returns atoms, then
Merge must be “at the root.” The operation Concatenate, which always applies to
atoms, cannot see anything but roots. Once the complex A^B is labeled A, as in
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8. Pietroski (2006b) explores a Fregean analogy, often noted, that may run deep: one can character-
ize the natural numbers in terms of zero and the relation less than, which is the transitive closure
or “ancestral” of the predecessor relation.
9. Given a system that strings atoms of a certain kind together, adding the operation LABEL will
yield a system that can generate structured versions of these atoms by the same operation. If the atoms
are lexical items, then the structured elements will look a lot like phrases.
10. If this is correct, then Bare Phrase Structure is not only methodologically prized on minimalist
grounds, but is required to achieve hierarchy from concatenation. Note that labeling does not turn
a phrase into a word, rather it endows it with the combinatorial powers of a word. Nonetheless,
phrases are distinct elements, as can be seen by their interpretive properties. Words may assign
theta roles, phrases do not. This, however, is a fact about how complex objects are interpreted, not
how the syntax treats them.
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(6b), the internal structure of [A A^B] is unavailable for subsequent concatenation;
this structure is hidden inside the concatenative atom A. The only eligible target
of concatenation is the A-labeled structure. So this is what Merge targets. Overlap
is blocked on the assumption that A and B are atomic at this point in the derivation,
just as “orthographic overlap” is blocked when concatenating words. (Combining
the and cat can yield the^cat, but not thec^at or th^ecat.)
In short, EC applies to Merge because Merge is Concatenate-plus-Label; and EC
applies to Concatenate, which is always “at the root,” because this elementary oper-
ation always applies to atoms. So if labeling is what marks a complex linguistic
object a potential concatenate, then nothing “internal” to a complex concatenate
will be a possible target of concatenation. Indeed, this is what it is for an expression
to be an atom with regard to Concatenate: the expression has no relevant internal
structure. This explanation is purely formal, in contrast with the more teleological
account of EC sketched above. An operation O that converts complexes into atoms
via labeling obeys EC because all O does is combine atoms, and atoms can only be
combined at their roots. Of course, if EC turns out to be computationally attrac-
tive, for the reasons mentioned above, then a Concatenate-plus-Label system will
inherit the relevant computational virtues (like monotonicity). It wouldn’t follow,
however, that the Concatenate-plus-Label system was somehow selected or favored
for its “nice” computational properties. Our account does not require or posit a
natural history with alternative language faculties that were somehow less useful.
On the contrary, our suggestion is that simple operations make it possible to gen-
erate endlessly many expressions, and these operations interact in ways that (nec-
essarily) have certain consequences like EC.11
Let us recapitulate. We have been describing, as opposed to stipulating, poten-
tially explanatory relations among several grammatically important notions: c-
command, EC, and labeling. We have done this by treating Move as a composite
operation, with Merge as a subpart, and then treating Merge itself as a species of
Concatenate. Labeling leverages hierarchy from Concatenate by mapping com-
plex concatenates into “derived” atoms. This requires understanding labels in a
BPS fashion. Thus, by “decomposing” Merge and Move into Copy, Concatenate,
and Label, we are able to relate the c-command property of chains to the hierar-
chical nature of phrases.
Can this be extended to account for other GB generalizations? We hope so.
One promising area of inquiry concerns the structural requirements on rules of
construal. In particular, why are bound anaphors and controlled PROs c-commanded
by their antecedents? The c-command requirement on antecedents reduces to more
basic facts if binding is coded by movement. This supposition has some empirical
backing (c.f. Bowers 2008, Hornstein 1999, 2001, 2003, Polinsky and Potsdam
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11. If this is correct, then Move is not a species of Merge (i.e. ReMerge) but involves some non-struc-
turally sensitive operation. See Hornstein 2009 for discussion where the Copy operation is sug-
gested to be this non-structurally sensitive operation. In effect, Copy need not be sensitive to con-
stituency because Merge/Concatenate already is. This is more fully discussed in Hornstein 2009 and
alternatives are considered which relax this atomicity assumption. 
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2002, Zwart 2002, Lidz and Idsardi 1997 etc).12 If bound pronouns are also pro -
ducts of movement (c.f. Kayne 2002) then principle B effects start falling into line
as well. A natural project would be to show that movement underlies all binding
phenomena, and that this is the source of the corresponding c-command con-
straint(s). 
C-command also plays a role in computing minimality, characterized in (10).
(10) Minimality Condition:
A movement operation cannot involve X1 and X3 over an X2 which is rele-
vantly identical to X3 if X2 c-commands X3:…..X1….X2….X3….
So we can once again raise the question of why c-command is relevant.
Here is a suggestion. The intuition behind Rizzi’s original proposal is that gram-
mars prefer shorter dependencies to longer ones. In other words, minimality codes
a preference for relations among elements/positions that are as short as possible
(see Rizzi 1990, Chomsky and Lasnik 1993). On the assumption that dependen-
cies incur a computational cost, minimizing dependency length is what we expect.13
So the next question is: how do grammars evaluate distance? How is the length of
a dependency determined, such that shorter ones trump longer ones? Or echoing
a Marr-style question, how is distance grammatically computed?
One obvious thought is that grammars measure distance by the nodes inter-
vening between related expressions, i.e. a path (see Pesetsky 1982, Kayne 1983,
May 1985), and that minimality amounts to the injunction to minimize path length. 
Paths are the natural measures of distance within hierarchically structured
objects, especially if those objects have no sequential order. Indeed, it is hard to
see how else to code proximity between items in a hierarchically structured object
like a phrase marker in which elements have not been linearized.14 So given that
phrases are hierarchically ordered, one might well expect paths to be the measures
of linguistic distance.
Consider an example to fix ideas. In (11), the path of the what targeting C0 is
the set of nodes {VP, vP, TP, CP}. These are the maximal projections that domi-
nate the launch site of what (in VP) and its landing site (in CP).
(11) [CP what C0 [TP who T0 [vP v [VP buy what ]]]]
These paths provide a natural measure of the distance between what and Spec C.
The preference for short dependencies can be recast as the maxim that path length
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12. This is clearly related to the project first outlined in Koster 1984 and many papers since. 
13. The cost of longer dependencies makes sense on a variety of natural assumptions—e.g., that depen-
dencies require various kinds of memory resources to be coded, and that the longer the depen-
dency the greater the resource requirements. The exact specification of memory cost is not rele-
vant, so long as it has some nonneglible cost.
14. This is the standard current assumption for any theory in which Spell Out is what sequentially
orders terminals in a phrase.
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should be minimized. For example, if some expression moves to check a feature
of the target—like the WH feature on C0 in (11)—the grammar accomplishes this
with the shortest possible move. This raises the question of how grammars com-
pare paths.
Assume that NLGs are restricted to Boolean measures15 and so the relative size
of two finite sets is fixed whenever one is a proper subset of the other. In the exam-
ple above, the who-path {CP, TP} is a proper subset of the what-path {CP, TP, vP,
VP}. So the former path is shorter in the relevant sense. If we assume that grammars
compare path lengths by computing the relevant subset relations (i.e. that path com-
parison is restricted to Boolean comparisons), it follows that minimality is con-
strained by c-command, as (10) requires.
This is illustrated by considering a structure like (12) and comparing it with (11).
(12) [CP C0 [TP [DP …Wh2] T0 [vP t1 [VP V Wh1]]]] 
The paths of Wh1 and Wh2 to C0 are as follows: P(Wh1) = {VP, vP, TP, CP};
and P(Wh2) = {DP, TP, CP}. Neither is a proper subset of the other. So neither
path is longer than the other, in the sense of length that matters here. In general,
paths will be comparable with respect to length just in case they meet the c-com-
mand condition in (10). If grammars prize shorter dependencies over longer ones,
and the language faculty uses Boolean resources to evaluate grammatical options,
then (10) will be a correct but not basic description of the facts—and it will fol-
low that only c-commanding elements are relevant to minimality.
This conception of minimality has many further interesting consequences that
we can only mention here.16 For example, given this conception, the A-over-A con-
dition becomes a special case of minimality. Another consequence is that multi-
ple specifiers of a common head are equidistant from a target; that is, the equidis-
tance principle in Chomsky 1995 is a special case of minimality so understood.
Moreover, combined with the BPS interpretation of labels noted above, we can
explain why only MaxPs count in computing paths. Last, this way of understand-
ing minimality comes close to deriving structure preservation conditions—why
DPs move, D’s don’t, and D0s move only in limited ways. We leave the derivation
of these conclusions as an exercise for the reader.17
Minimalist considerations suggest that basic grammatical operations and prin-
ciples are not (largely) sui generis. We have proposed one way of decomposing
some standardly posited operations and principles in terms of simpler ones that
are more cognitively generic. And we have shown how a system that combined
these simpler operations, in the ways outlined above, would appear to have many
distinctive properties that characterize NLGs (e.g. hierarchy, headedness, structure
preservation, c-command etc). In the next section, we argue that our basic opera-
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15. This is plausibly the weakest assumption one can make and, given minimalist reasoning, the favored
conclusion.
16. For further elaboration see Hornstein 2009.
17. One derivation is outlined in Hornstein 2009. 
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tions also make good semantic sense in the context of neo-Davidsonian theories
of meaning. 
3. Conjoin, Thematically Relate, and Close
We have suggested three basic grammatical operations: concatenation, a certain
kind of labeling, and copying.18 One wants to know how these operations are relat-
ed to meaning (and what this implies for lexicalization). Moreover, absent a specific
semantic proposal, one might worry that the envisioned syntax is less minimal than
it initially appears to be. 
To take an extreme example, imagine a theory according to which concatena-
tion signifies function-application, each label is an opportunity for type-shifting,
and copies are bindable variables that can be targets of an unrestricted abstraction
operation. Given a suitable lexicon, such a theory might be descriptively adequate,
in the sense of letting theorists compositionally represent any meaning that any
speaker (young or old) can assign to any string. But the cost would be massive
overgeneration, in the sense of permitting endlessly many <string, meaning> pairs
that speakers cannot naturally generate. In our view, this kind of explanatory fail-
ure reflects overly powerful description of the faculty that makes I-languages pos-
sible, as opposed to insufficient description of independent cognitive constraints
(e.g., memory) on human use of linguistic composition. 
Correspondingly, our goal is to associate basic grammatical operations with
basic semantic operations that have the following properties: they are, together,
just powerful enough for descriptive adequacy (given the proposed syntax); yet
they are still natural operations, in the sense of being plausible candidates for imple-
mentation by children—and at least largely, by our recent nonhuman ancestors. To
the extent possible, we also want any novel twists that make human syntax and
semantics distinctive to be two sides of one coin. In the context of our proposal
that labeling is the key to making human syntax out of mere concatenation, we
suggest that labeling is also the vehicle for making human semantics out of some
ancient operation associated with concatenation.
Unsurprisingly, then, we suggest that concatenation has a simple and uniform
interpretation across all expressions. In particular, we think that concatenation sig-
nifies conjunction of monadic concepts, and hence that cases of elementary adjunc-
tion—as in ‘red ball’—are paradigms of semantic composition. The flip side of
this proposal will be that labeling mismatches (as with heads and complements)
invoke thematic concepts. This inverts a more traditional picture (discussed in 3.2)
according to which concatenation signifies saturation of one concept by another.
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ested reader is referred for details.
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3.1. Concatenation Signifies Conjunction
If only for simplification, let’s say that (i) an atomic expression is an instruction
to fetch a concept, of some appropriate type, that was linked to the expression in the
course of lexicalization, and (ii) combining expressions is an instruction to com-
bine, via some operation, concepts that have been fetched or formed via the expres-
sions. Let CONCAT be the operation signified by concatenation. Then A^B, the
mere concatenation of A with B, would be the following complex instruction: apply
CONCAT, whatever operation that is, to concepts obtained by executing the subin-
structions (subexpressions) A and B. But it is an open question whether there are
any grammatical expressions of the unlabeled form A^B. Our hypothesis is that
CONCAT is an operation of monadic concept conjunction, and correlatively, that
atomic expressions are instructions to fetch monadic concepts.19 And our view
allows for unlabeled concatenations; perhaps cases of pure adjunction are exam-
ples (cp. Chametsky [1996]). But for these purposes, it will be simpler and more
illustrative to suppose that every expression has a label, with one caveat. 
Our view is compatible with the idea that labels are functional formatives, which
combine with unlabeled lexical roots, and hence that a word belonging to a lexical
category is already a complex expression. For example, the noun ‘stab’ might be
the result of concatenating a root √stab with a nominalizing element that also labels
the resulting expression—[N √stab^N], a.k.a. stabN —while the homophonous verb
[V √stab^V], a.k.a. stabV, has a different covert constituent; see Halle and Marantz(1993), Borer (2005). This leaves room for the idea that phrases like ‘red ball’ are
labeled concatenations of an unlabeled root with a labeled head, as in [N √red^ballN],
where the noun may itself be complex. We can accommodate this idea.
[N √red^ballN] = 
LABEL[CONCATENATE(√red, ballN)] =
LABEL[CONCATENATE(√red, LABEL[CONCATENATE(√ball, N)]]
Note that in such cases, if such there be, there is no “choice” about how to label
the concatenations. In the example above, N is the only label, and hence the only
projectable label. One can go on to speculate, drawing on Baker (2005), that N is
an instruction to fetch a formal concept like INDEXABLE(_), while V is an instruction
to fetch a formal concept like TENSABLE(_); see Pietroski (forthcoming).
Nonetheless, [N √red^ballN] is labeled, and thus not a mere concatenation of
the form A^B. So absent a hypothesis about the role of labeling, a hypothesis about
CONCAT doesn’t determine the semantic character of [N √red^ballN]. Put anoth-
er way, let COM be the operation signified by COMBINE. Then on our view,
COM differs from CONCAT, much as COMBINE differs from CONCATENATE.
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19. See Pietroski (2007, forthcoming) for discussion and independent defense of the idea that lexical
items are instructions to fetch monadic concepts, even if the concepts lexicalized are not monadic.
The idea is that lexicalization may be a partly creative process that involves abstraction of a monadic
concept from a nonmonadic concept lexicalized. 
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In many cases, COM(A, B) ≠ CONCAT(A, B). For example, [V stabV^CaesarN]
is not an instruction to conjoin concepts fetched via stabV and CaesarN. So we need
to say how COM differs from CONCAT, in terms of a spare but descriptively ade-
quate semantic role for labels. 
One way of encoding this idea is by treating constituents of labeled expres-
sions as relativized instructions. For example, [N √red^ballN] can be treated as a
label-relativized instruction: execute the subinstruction √red-as-N, execute the
subinstruction ballN -as-N, and conjoin the two resulting concepts. Similar remarks
apply to [V √stab^V], [V stabV^CaesarN], and [D everyD^ballN]. Formally, this intro-
duces a degree of freedom.20 But the interpretive effect of this formal freedom may
be minimal. 
The phrase [N √red^ballN] is explicitly labeled as an instruction of the same
type as the word ballN. And a plausible constraint is that relativizing a label to itself
has no semantic effect. In which case, ballN-as-N just is the instruction ballN. So
if concatenation signifies conjunction, [N √red^ballN] is plausibly an instruction to
execute the subinstruction ballN and conjoin the result with a concept formed by
executing the subinstruction √red-as-N. If relativizing an unlabeled root to a label
also has no semantic effect, then √red-as-N just is the instruction √red, and the
labeled phrase [N √red^ballN] is interpreted as the mere concatenation √red^ballN
would be interpreted.21
COM(√red, ballN) = CONCAT(√red-as-N, ballN -as-N) 
= CONCAT(√red, ballN)
Likewise, if ballN = [N √ball^N], this would be a simple instruction to conjoin
concepts fetched via the root √ball and label N, with the result that [N √red [N√ball^N]] is an instruction to construct a concept like RED( ) & BALL( ) & INDEX-
ABLE( ). 
More generally, labeling might have a semantic effect that distinguishes a
labeled expression from the corresponding unlabeled concatenation only when the
constituents/concatenates have competing labels. The instruction COM(A, B) might
differ from CONCAT(A, B), in terms of concepts constructed, only when A and B
differ in ways that require resolution about the kind of instruction that the resulting
phrase— LABEL[CONCATENATE(A, B)]—is to be. In section 3.2, we’ll con-
trast this idea with a structurally similar but more traditional view that associates con-
catenation with function-application. But first, let us sketch our neo-Davidsonian
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20. This is a highly restricted version of the more descriptively powerful relativization introduced, for
different reasons, by Higginbotham (1986). But it mirrors Higginbotham’s (1985) distinction
between theta-linking and theta-marking.
21. We suspect that ‘red ball’ may exhibit a kind of ambiguity, as between [N √red^ballN] and a more
complex expression—perhaps [N [N redA^one]^ballN], with a covert pronominal coindexed with
‘ball’—that has roughly the following meaning: ball that is red for a ball; cp. ‘big ant’; cp.
Higginbotham (1985), Pietroski (2005, 2006b). But we cannot here consider the voluminous literature
on comparative constructions; see, e.g., Kennedy (200x) and references there.
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proposal about [V stabV^CaesarN], assuming for now that stabV is an instruction to
fetch a monadic concept of events (stabs), and that CaesarN is an instruction to
fetch a monadic concept—like CAESARIZER(X), or perhaps CALLED(X, ‘CAESAR’)
& INDEXED(X, 1)—that applies to exactly one person.22
Labeling introduces grammatical relations, like being the internal argument of
a predicate, that are plausible vehicles for a limited range of “participation” relations
like being the Patient of an event. This suggests that certain grammatical relations
are devices for invoking thematic relations. There are many ways of encoding this
idea. But suppose that being an internal argument of a predicate is a two-step “macro”
instruction: execute the subinstruction issued by the argument expression itself, there-
by obtaining some monadic concept C(x); and immediately form the corresponding
complex monadic concept ∃[C(X) & INTERNAL(_, X)]. We assume that the relevant
conjunction and (existential) closure operations are not distinctly human.
This treats the relativized instruction CaesarN-as-V as an instruction to create a
concept of things that have Caesar as their internal participant. We assume that
while stabs are distinct from ordered pairs of individuals, like {Brutus, {Caesar}},
stabs still have internal participants. And one can say that internal participants of
stabs are Patients.
∀E{STAB(E) ⊃ ∀X[INTERNAL(E,X) ≡ PATIENT(E, X)]} 
Knowing this may be part of knowing what ‘stab’ means. Other verbs may be
used to fetch concepts of states or other “eventualities” whose internal participants
are unaffected Themes.23 But in any case, for verbs of any given thematic class,
the formal concept INTERNAL(E, X) can be replaced with a more specific thematic con-
tent. And whatever one says about the role associated with being the direct object
of ‘stab’, one can say that COM(stabV, CaesarN) = CONCAT(stabV, CaesarN-as-V);
where CONCAT(A, B) is a macro instruction to execute A, execute B, and con-
join the two resulting concepts. 
Likewise, suppose the external argument (specifier) of a verb phrase is gram-
matically distinguished from the internal argument (complement): by being the
argument of a covert “small verb,” as in [
v
BrutusN^[v v^[V stabV^CaesarN]]]; or
because being combined with a complex V, as in [
v
BrutusN^[V stabV^CaesarN]], is
recognizably different from being combined with a lexical V. Either way, one can
say that the external argument (BrutusN-as-external) is the following relativized
macro: execute the subinstruction issued by BrutusN itself, thereby obtaining some
monadic concept B(X); and immediately form the corresponding concept, ∃X[B(X)
& EXTERNAL(_, X)].Then executing the external-argument instruction will yield a
concept of things that have Brutus as their external participant. So given lexical
information to the effect that external participants of stabs are agents,
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22. See, e.g., Burge (1973), Katz (1994), Longobardi (1994).
23. For relevant discussion, see Dowty (1991), Pesetsky (1982), Kratzer (1996), Baker (1997) and re -
ferences there; see also Pietroski (2005), Williams (2007).
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∀E{STAB(E) ⊃ ∀X[EXTERNAL(E,X) ≡ AGENT(E, X)]}
‘Brutus stab Caesar’ can serve as an instruction to build a concept like the following:
∃X[BRUTUSIZER(X) & AGENT(_, X)] & STAB(_) & ∃X[CAESARIZER(X) & PATIENT(_, X)].
In cases where the verb is tensed, the tense morpheme can be treated as an
instruction to fetch a temporal monadic concept, and existential closure (on the
only open variable) will yield a truth-evaluable claim like (13). 
(13) ∃{∃X[BRUTUSIZER(X) & AGENT(_, X)] & STAB(_) & PAST(_) &
∃X[CAESARIZER(X) & PATIENT(_, X)]}
Alternatively, the untensed clause may be the internal argument of a larger verb
phrase as in ‘see Brutus stab Caesar’, 
SEE(_) & ∃X{INTERNAL(_, X) & ∃X’[BRUTUSIZER(X’) & EXTERNAL(X, X’)] &
STAB(X) & ∃X’[CAESARIZER(X’) & INTERNAL(X, X’)]}
which can be treated semantically on a par with ‘see a tree’. 24
SEE(_) & ∃X[INTERNAL(_, X) & TREE(X)]
Initially, it might seem odd to treat both grammatical predicates and grammat-
ical arguments as instructions to make conjoinable monadic concepts, which can
be converted into complete thoughts by means of existential closure. But this might
have been a workable strategy for the minds that initially faced the task of inter-
preting I-language expressions. Social primates can surely represent individuals as
event participants. There is an ancient tradition of taking monadic concepts (and
subject-predicate thoughts) to be logically special. Existential closure is an espe-
cially simple way to convert a monadic concept into a truth-evaluable thought. And
while Frege viewed sentences as names for truth values, Tarski showed how to view
them as predicates (satisfied by everything or nothing). So it is at least possible that
I-languages are procedures for generating instructions to systematically create con-
junctive monadic concepts that are easily converted into truth-evaluable thoughts.
This does treat “macro instructions” as restricted type-shifters, which create con-
cepts of things with participants from concepts of things that can be participants;
where the shifting is induced by the need to treat concatenation uniformly as a sign
for predicate-conjunction. But as discussed in 3.2 below, this may be the simplest kind
of shifting that accommodates both adjunction and complementation.
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24. See Higginbotham (1983), Parsons (1990). Prima facie, the basic significance of combining declar-
ative sentences in a discourse is also conjunctive. But the “final” closure of a variable, yielding a
truth-evaluable object, may reflect a cognitive interface with the language system—as opposed to
a grammatical formative.
CatJourLing 8 001-189:CatJL  11/1/10  13:19  Página 129
Prepositional phrases can also be treated as instructions to construct complex
monadic concepts conjoinable with others. The nounish concept fetched with
RomeN may not be coherently conjoinable with the verbish concept constructed
by executing [V BrutusN^[V stabV^CaesarN]]. But [P inP^RomeN]—the result of
labeling inP^RomeN as a phrase headed by the functional item inP—can be an
instruction of the same type as stabV^[V stabV CaesarN]^[V BrutusN [V stabV
CaesarN]]; and likewise for [P inP MarchN]. Think of inP as playing two roles, much
like a verb: it imposes a constraint of its own, to the effect that values of its variable
be “containables;” but more importantly, it takes a complement like RomeN, and
thereby creates a relativized instruction to form a monadic concept like
∃X[CONTAINER(_, X) & ROME(X)]. In which case, executing [P inP RomeN] can yield
a concept like CONTAINEE(_) & ∃X[CONTAINER(_, X) & ROME(X)], which can be con-
joined with a concept likw STAB(_) & ∃X[PATIENT(_, X) & CAESARIZER(X)].
On this view, inP serves to convert an instruction to form a concept of a poten-
tial container into an instruction to form a concept of something as contained.
Similar remarks apply to other prepositions. Indeed, one might even think of head-
complement and head-specifier relations as “dedicated prepositions.” This would
explain the near synonymy of ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’ and ‘There was a stabbing
of Caesar by Brutus’. 
This assumes that the labels ‘P’ and ‘V’ do not conflict: relativizing a preposi-
tional instruction to a verbal label, as in [V [V stabV^CaesarN]]^[P inP^RomeN]], does
not affect interpretation. The idea is that [P inP^RomeN]-as-V just is the instruction
[P inP^RomeN]; the adjunct is understood as an instruction to create a concept of
things contained in Rome, not a concept whose external participants are contained
in Rome. But this assumption is not ad hoc. For on our view, the preposition is itself
a remedy for the mismatch between the verbish instruction [V [V stabV^CaesarN]]
and the nounish instruction RomeN. There is no mismatch, calling for further rem-
edy, between inP and [V [V stabV^CaesarN]]. In this sense, we endorse the old idea that
verbs and nouns have conflicting features—[+V, -N] vs. [-V, +N], tensable vs. index-
able—and that prepositions [-V, -N] are neither nounish or verbish, and hence com-
patible with both kinds of instructions.25 Prepositional phrases can modify nouns, as
in [N manN^[P inP^RomeN]] or [N stabN^[P inP^RomeN]]. So we assume that rela-
tivizing such phrases to nominal labels is also semantically inert. 
To recapitulate, COM differs from CONCAT. Labels are not irrelevant. On
the contrary, they provide vehicles for introducing dyadic concepts like INTER-
NAL(E, X), which can be replaced with more specific thematic contents given lex-
ical information. But COM differs from CONCAT only where it needs to—i.e.,
in cases where concatenates have competing labels. Correlatively, the device of
labeling makes it possible to have competing labels, which can be interpreted as
vehicles for introducing nonconjunctive aspects of meaning. The derivation below
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25. Verbs may require selection of V+ (tensable) concepts, while nouns require selection of N+ (index-
able) concepts, with prepositions imposing no further constraints along this dimension.
Adjectives/adverbs [+N, +V] may require a choice of one or the other, with a further phrasal con-
straint ruling out any “mixed” choice of the form +N^+V (noun/adjective^verb/adverb).
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illustrates the proposed tight connection between syntactic and semantic opera-
tions. 
A. Concatenate(stabV, CaesarN) → stabV^CaesarN
B. Label(A) → [V stabV CaesarN] Stab(e) & Patient(e, Caesar)
C. Concatenate(BrutusN, B) → BrutusN^[V stabV CaesarN] 
D. Label(C) → [V BrutusN [V stabV CaesarN]] 
Agent(e, Brutus) & Stab(e) & Patient(e, Caesar)
E. Concatenate(inP, MarchN) → inP^MarchN
F. Label(E) → [P inP MarchN] Containee(e) & Container(e, March)
G. Concatenate(D, F) → [V BrutusN [V stabV CaesarN]]^[P inP MarchN]
H. LABEL(G) → [V [V BrutusN [V stabV CaesarN]] [P inP MarchN]]
Agent(e, Brutus) & Stab(e) & Patient(e, Caesar) & Containee(e) & Container(e,
March)
3.2. Comparison with a More Familiar View
Given any theory that assigns a uniform interpretation to concatenation, either
adjunction or complementation (or both) must be treated as something other than
mere concatenation. We have opted for treating complementation as the special
case, calling for extra machinery in terms of labeling. This fits with the idea that
adjunction is the truly recursive part of natural language grammar. But even if con-
catenation is associated with a powerful recursive operation like function-applica-
tion, with lexical items signifying appropriate functions and domain elements,
appeals to “type-shifting” seem unavoidable; see, e.g., Parsons (1970), Kamp
(1975), Partee and Rooth (1983), Chierchia (1998), Jacobson (1999). In short, com-
plementation ends up looking complicated, no matter what.26 And we prefer to
keep at least one part of the grammar minimal. Still, it may be useful to compare
our view—about the relations among COM, CONCAT, and labels—with a struc-
turally similar but more traditional idea.
The idea of treating labeled expressions as relativized instructions is indepen-
dent of any particular hypothesis about CONCAT. For this is just one way of  saying
that given a phrase of the form [A A^B], the nondominant concatenate B may need
to be adjusted for purposes of semantic composition with A. The specific kind of
adjustment called for (if any) will depend on CONCAT and A. But one can hypoth-
esize that CONCAT is the operation of saturation (or function-application), and
that simple predicate-argument combination involves no further operation, while
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26. This leads many theorists to abandon the idea that concatenation has a uniform interpretation across
constructions, in favor of hypotheses according to which the significance of combining expres-
sions depends—one way or another—on the expressions being combined; see, e.g., Higginbotham
(1985), Larson and Segal (1995), Heim and Kratzer (1998), Chung and Ladusaw (2003), Culicover
and Jackendoff (2005). Though such pluralism makes it easier to achieve descriptive adequacy, it
comes at the cost of positing a more sophisticated language faculty, one that associates grammat-
ical combination with multiple kinds of semantic composition.
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predicate-adjunct combination invokes type-lifting. From this perspective, an expres-
sion that by itself calls for a concept of type <e, t> can be used as part of a macro
instruction to create a corresponding concept of type <<e, t>, <e, t>>. For exam-
ple, if ‘red’ by itself calls for the concept RED(_), then ‘red’-as-adjunct would call
for the higher-order concept λC.C(x) & RED(X). On this view, relativizing an argu-
ment to a predicate makes no difference to the instruction associated with the argu-
ment, but relativizing an adjunct to a predicate is an instruction to type-lift. 
Let’s continue to underline grammatical arguments. In 3.1, we construed under-
lining as an instruction to relativize nonvacuously, thus signaling a substantive
“label relativization.” But one might instead think of underlining as an instruc-
tion to relativize vacuously, thus precluding substantive relativization of the con-
stituent semantic instruction. The phrase [V stabV^CaesarN] would then be a macro
instruction to perform saturation on concepts obtained by executing the follow-
ing two vacuously relativized instructions: stabV relative to itself (i.e, stabV), and
CaesarN relative to stabV (i.e., CaesarN). By contrast, [N redA ballN] would be an
instruction to perform saturation on concepts obtained by executing the follow-
ing two instructions, one of which is nonvacuously relativized: redA relative to
ballN, and ballN relative to itself; where redA relative to ballN is a macro instruc-
tion concepts to execute redA and type-lift. The net result of executing [N redA
ballN] would be to saturate λC.C(x) & RED(X) with BALL(X), yielding BALL(X) &
RED(X).
One can get the same net result by simply conjoining BALL(X) with RED(X). As
sketched above, neo-Davidsonians can treat verb-complement and verb-specifier
combinations as interaction effects involving both concatenation and labeling. So
especially given that verbs are associated with thematic roles, one way or anoth-
er, it is no simpler to treat complementation and adjunction in terms of saturation
and type-lifting. But one might think that determiners, which can also take inter-
nal/external arguments, tell in favor of the idea that concatenation at least some-
times signifies saturation. In which case, one might argue that Minimalist reason-
ing suggests that concatenation always signifies saturation. So we conclude by
briefly noting that even determiners can be viewed as instructions to fetch monadic
concepts, albeit plural monadic concepts. The idea is that determiner-complement
and determiner-specifier combinations are also interaction effects involving both
concatenation and labeling.
Given the singular arguments ‘Brutus’ and ‘Caesar’, it does no harm to view
the event variable in (13) as singular. 
(13) ∃{∃X[BRUTUSIZER(X) & AGENT(_, X)] & STAB(_) & PAST(_) &
∃X[CAESARIZER(X) & PATIENT(_, X)]}.
But given plural arguments, as in (14), plural event variables are required; see
Schein (1993, 2006) and Pietroski (2005, 2006a), among others.
(14) The doctors stabbed the oranges with knives on Monday 
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The idea, which we cannot develop here in detail, is that (14) is true iff there were
some events that satisfied each of the following conditions: their Agents were the
doctors; they were stabbings; their Themes were the oranges; they were done with
knives; and they occurred on Monday. Following Boolos (1998), one can treat a
plural variable as a variable that has more than one value relative to each assignment
of values to variables. This provides an independently attractive treatment of “essen-
tially plural” predicates, like the verb phrases in (15).
(15) The rocks rained down on the huts that surrounded the lakes
Given plural variables, labeling, and copying, one can also accommodate deter-
miners. The details illustrate why and how it can be useful to hypothesize that
certain expressions exhibit semantic effects that reflect interactions of our posit-
ed basic operations. Consider (16). If the grammatical structure is simply as in
(16a),
(16) Brutus stabbed every senator
(16a) [T past [V BrutusD [V stabV [D everyD senatorN]]]]
the determiner phrase is a constituent of a phrase labeled ‘V’, raising well-known
difficulties for semantic composition. But if lexical properties of ‘every’ demand that
‘every senator’ combine with something to form a complex expression of the same
type as ‘every’, and the operation of copying is available, then the relevant gram-
matical structure is arguably as shown in (16b);
(16b) [D [D everyD senatorN] ∃:[T past [V BrutusD [V stabV [D everyD senatorN]]]]]
where ‘∃:’ indicates existential closure of the event predicate, introduced by stabV,
and italics indicates a copy of an expression previously concatenated. As noted
above, one can think of this closure (not as a long-distance dependency encoded
in the syntax, but rather) as a reflex of how the language faculty—which cyclical-
ly generates complex monadic predicates—interfaces with cognitive systems that
traffic in complete thoughts that are truth evaluable.
Suppose that only the higher copy of the determiner phrase in (16b) is inter-
preted, perhaps because the lower copy of everyD fails to have an external argu-
ment. Then (16b) will be interpreted as an expression in which ‘every’ has an “exis-
tentially closed tense phrase” as its external argument, where this external argument
has a gap: ∃^[T past [V BrutusD [V stabV ...]]]. A “gappy” expression of this sort
can, like the sentence ‘Brutus stabbed him’, be interpreted as having a truth value
relative to an assignment of a value to variable. Put another way, an open sentence
can be viewed as an assignment-relative predicate of truth values: true if there was
a stab by Brutus of the thing assigned to the variable, and false otherwise. In fact,
while appealing to truth values is familiar and expositorily convenient, it is not
required; see Pietroski (forthcoming) for presentation in a sparer framework that
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eschews truth values, expressions of type <t>, propositional conjunction, and
requires only a highly restricted version of existential quantification. But for pre-
sent purposes, let’s go with expository convenience.
If open sentences are predicates of truth values, then ‘every’ takes a predicate
of individuals as its internal (nominal) argument and an assignment-relative pred-
icate of truth values as its external (sentential) argument. But our suggestion is not
that the direction of explanation is from lexical demands imposed by the deter-
miner to the resulting syntax/semantics. 
On the contrary, we think of everyD as a device that lexicalizes a quantifica-
tional concept in accord with demands imposed by the syntax/semantics. So if
everyD demands an external argument, yet ends up in a position where its external
argument is an open sentence, then (given our proposed combinatorics) the deter-
miner must be understood as a predicate of things whose external participants are
the values of open sentences. If these values are classical, then determiners are
predicates of things whose external participants are true or false.
Initially, this might seem odd. But on our neo-Davidsonian account of verbs,
stabV is understood as a predicate of events, even if the concept lexicalized is rela-
tional; see Pietroski (2007, forthcoming). From this perspective, lexicalizers may
well abstract the monadic concept STAB(E) from the relational concept STAB(X, Y)
or STAB(X, Y, E), by drawing on thematic concepts: STAB(X, Y) ≡ ∃E[STAB(X, Y, E)];
STAB(X, Y, E) ≡ AGENT(E, X) & STAB(E) & PATIENT(E, Y). Think of these bicondi-
tionals as providing a contextual definition of STAB(E), not a decomposition of
STAB(X, Y). In this way, stabV can be an instruction to fetch a monadic concept—per-
haps abstracted in the course of lexicalization—of things whose external partici-
pants are Agents.
Likewise, everyD can be an instruction to fetch a monadic concept of things
with participants (because of where everyD appears in interpreted structures), even
if the concept lexicalized is a genuine second-order relation (as it surely is with
mostD). In this sense, we take the idea of quantifier raising seriously, but without
positing QR as a basic operation: if a determiner phrase raises from a sentential
clause (for whatever reason), it remerges with that clause, which remains senten-
tial. This turns out to be an empirically attractive approach.
Other semantic theories often mask the “open sentence” character of a raised
determiner’s external argument, by hypothesizing some kind of type adjustment
according to which the relevant sentential constituent—an expression of type <t>—
behaves like a noun or relative clause of type <e, t>. Prima facie, this is implausi-
ble, since determiners cannot take overt relative clauses as external arguments.
Note that while ‘Every senator who arrived is a liar’ is a fine sentence, ‘Every sen-
ator who arrived who is a liar’ is not, and ‘Every senator who is a liar’ cannot mean
that every senator is a liar. Of course, if ‘every’ signifies a function of type 
<<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>>—from functions of the sort indicated by nouns, onto func-
tions that map functions of the sort indicated by relative clauses onto truth val-
ues—then one must posit some kind of type adjustment. But this raises the difficult
question, discussed by Barwise and Cooper (1981) among others, of why easily
conceivable though “nonconservative” functions cannot be signified with deter-
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miners. In short, the side-effects of adjustment may be worse than the initial prob-
lem. And one can adopt a different semantics for determiners. 
We embrace the idea that ‘every’ takes a sentential external argument. If
‘every’ can take a predicate of individuals as its internal argument, and an assign-
ment-relative predicate of truth values as its external argument, then perhaps
‘every’ is satisfied by things that have individuals as their internal participants
and truth values as their external participants. There is no mystery about what
such things might be: ordered pairs of the form {{e}, t} will do the job; where e
is an entity, like an individual senator, and t is a truth value. Call these “Frege-
Pairs,” and note that one is already committed to such pairs if one appeals to
functions of type <e, t>. So any posited “expansion” of the usual domain is min-
imal: in addition to entities and truth values, we appeal to ordered pairs of these,
with truth values as the external elements—mirroring the grammatical fact that
the external arguments of determiners are sentential. Suppose that ‘every’ is sat-
isfied by one or more Frege-Pairs iff every one of them associates its entity with
the value true. The idea is that ‘every’ can be satisfied plurally, by many Frege-
Pairs “at once,” so long as each of those Frege-Pairs associates its entity with
truth. Likewise, suppose that some Frege-Pairs satisfy ‘some’ iff at least one of
them associates its entity with true; they satisfy ‘no’ iff none of them associates
its entity with true; and so on.
If everyD is understood as a predicate of Frege-Pairs, and senatorN is under-
stood as a predicate of individuals, these expressions cannot be simply conjoined.
But the lexical instruction senatorN, which bears no essential relation to any deter-
miner, can be distinguished from the relativized instruction senatorN–as-D (i.e.,
senatorN as complement of a determiner). In this phrasal guise, the noun can be
understood as semantically subordinate, with a meaning that manifests as part of a
macro instruction to create a concept of things with the senators as internal par-
ticipants. With this is mind, recall (16c).
(16c) [D1 [D everyD senatorN]∃^[T past [V BrutusD [V stabV …1]]]]
The index, which indicates the “gap” corresponding to the lower copy of the
determiner phrase, can be interpreted like a pronoun. But the important idea is that
in (16c), everyD and its arguments can be understood as instructions to create con-
cepts of Frege-Pairs, much as ‘stab’ and its arguments can be understood as instruc-
tions to create concepts of of events. The internal argument of everyD can be an
instruction to create a concept of those Frege-Pairs whose internal participants are
the senators. (Half will be of the form <e, true>, where e is a senator, and these
Frege-Pairs will also satisfy everyD.) The external argument—the existentially
closed tense phrase with an indexed gap—can be an instruction to create a con-
cept of those Frege-Pairs that meet the following condition: the external partici-
pant is true iff Brutus stabbed the internal participant; or more explicitly, the Frege-
Pair’s external participant is true iff its internal participant was the Patient of a
stabbing whose Agent was Brutus. A pair of the form <e, true> meets this condi-
tion iff Brutus stabbed the entity e in question.
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The details, including those concerning multiply quantified expressions, are
provided in Pietroski (2005, 2006a). The leading idea is that given an assignment
Ω that associates some variable with a value, a Frege-Pair <e, t> determines a vari-
ant assignment Ω’ that is like Ω except for associating the variable with e; where
t is a potential (truth) value of a sentence relative to the variant assignment.
Unsurprisingly, a Tarskian semantics for (16c) does not require a type-adjustment
that implausibly blurs the distinction between embedded sentences and relative
clauses. But technicalities aside, the result is that (16c) can be interpreted as a com-
plex predicate—built from lexical elements via Concatenate, Label, and Copy—
that is satisfied by things that meet the following three conditions: every one of
them associates an entity with true; they associate the senators with truth values;
and they associate entities with truth values in accord with the rule “true iff the
entity was stabbed by Brutus.” 
While (16c) is a predicate on this view, a final existential closure—corre-
sponding to the claim that there are one or more Frege-Pairs that meet each of
these three conditions—yields the right truth condition for (16): true iff every sen-
ator was stabbed by Brutus. If this is correct, no special explanation is needed for
why determiners cannot indicate nonconservative functions of type <<e, t>, <<e,
t>, t>>. If determiners are instructions to create concepts of Frege-Pairs, they never
indicate functions of this higher type. Put another way, determiners do not indi-
cate relations between predicates. So trivially, determiners do not indicate non-
conservative relations. And while actual determiners can be described as predi-
cates of Frege-Pairs, words that indicate nonconservative relations (like
equinumerosity) cannot. The reason—which also helps explain why determiner
phrases are understood as restricted quantifiers, and why they cannot take relative
clauses as external arguments—is obvious: only the internal/nominal argument of
a determiner corresponds to a set of individuals; the external/sentential argument does
not, pace standard theories, specify a second set. Taking our spare syntax serious-
ly has semantic payoffs.
4. Concluding Remarks
Since our introduction can also serve as a summary, we will end briefly. By decom-
posing the operation COMBINE (or MERGE) into the simpler operations CON-
CATENATE and LABEL, one can simplify extant conceptions of syntax, while
also extending their explanatory reach. One can also view grammatical combina-
tion in human languages as the result of adding a new twist—labels—to the more
cognitively ancient operation of concatenation. By decomposing the significance of
COMBINE into simpler operations, corresponding to the semantic roles of CON-
CATENATE and LABEL (conjunction of monadic concepts, and a restricted kind
of thematic shifting), one can also simplify extant conceptions semantics while
extending their explanatory reach. In short, applying minimalist reasoning to syn-
tax and semantic simultaneously has payoffs for each, as well as the overall theo-
ry of grammar.
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